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RECENT DECISIONS 
AsSOCIATIONS-EXPULSION, SUSPENSION, OR EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS-
PHYSICIAN'S RIGHT TO MEMBERSHIP IN CouNTY MEDICAL SocIETY-Plaintiff 
had satisfied all state requirements for the practice of medicine on the 
basis of work at an osteopathic college and residency at an osteopathic hos-
pital, and had received a state license to practice medicine and surgery. 
Subsequently, plaintiff attended an AMA accredited medical college which 
awarded him a degree based in part on his osteopathic training. The 
Middlesex County Medical Society1 refused to admit plaintiff into active 
membership because he had not fulfilled the membership requirement of 
four years of study in a medical school approved by the AMA.2 As a 
result, two private hospitals terminated plaintiff's staff membership and 
hospital privileges. In an action in lieu of mandamus,3 held, £or petitioner. 
Exclusion from the Medical Society was void, and the Society must admit 
plaintiff into active membership. The Medical Society is an involuntary 
organization whose application of a membership rule contrary to the re-
quirements of the State Board of Medical Examiners is contrary to public 
policy and causes substantial injury to plaintiff. Falcone v. Middlesex 
County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 325 (1960). 
The court treats this case as one concerning the rights of an individual 
to membership in a private organization.4 The basic issue, however, is 
not membership, but whether the plaintiff has a right, without reference 
to membership in the Medical Society, to be eligible to use the hospital 
facilities in Middlesex County on the basis of his professional qualifica-
tions. In order to give judicial relief, the court must thus limit either the 
discretion of hospitals in the choice of their staff members or the dis-
cretion of the Medical Society, a private unincorporated association, to 
choose its members. It has generally been held that private hospitals5 have 
1 An unincorporated association, hereinafter referred to as the Medical Society. 
2 See The American lifedical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized 
Medicine, 63 YALE L. J. 938 (1954). 
3 The New Jersey Constitution was amended in 1947 to allow persons to bring actions 
in the Superior Court where relief would formerly have been granted only by prerogative 
writ. N. J. CoNsr. art VI, § 5; cf. Switz v. Middletown Township, 23 N.J. 580, 589, 130 
A.2d 15, 20 (1957) (essential nature of mandamus not altered by the CoNsr. of 1947); see 
Annot., 137 A.L.R. 311 (1942). 
4 See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. 
L. REv. 993 (1930), for a discussion of private organizations. Although the society in the 
principal case is a private unincorporated organization, it is a member organization in the 
state medical society which is incorporated and which does exercise rights granted by the 
state to nominate candidates for appointment by the governor to the Board of Medical 
Examiners and to confer the degree of doctor of medicine. The court does not treat this 
connection as controlling, however, but bases relief on the coercive practices of the 
Medical Society. 
r; Separate doctrines relate to the power of public hospitals to discriminate in choosing 
staff members. The general rule is that such choice cannot be arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58,230 P.2d 526 (1951); Hamilton 
County Hospital v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 
831 (1949). 
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complete discretion in their choice of staff members, even if exercised 
arbitrarily.6 To limit the hospital's discretion would require the court 
to find against the weight of authority and policy.7 This court therefore 
chose to base its relief upon the ground that plaintiff had a right to mem-
bership in the Medical Society. 
Private organizations may, subject to two limitations, exercise dis-
cretion in the choice of their members.8 First, members who are expelled 
are guaranteed certain procedural and substantive safeguards in the ex-
pulsion proceedings.9 Second, if the organization legally controls the right 
to practice a profession, the courts will order the organization to admit 
properly qualified applicants.10 In treating this case as presenting a 
membership question, the court had difficulty in finding a right to mem-
bership according to existing law, and was forced to resort to deviations 
and extensions of existing doctrines. The court's departure entailed the 
extension of the doctrine of expulsion cases to cover exclusion situations,11 
and the origination of an "involuntary organization" concept.12 
Some courts have held that a plaintiff expelled from membership had to 
show a particular property1 3 or contract14 right in the organization in 
order to obtain a reinstatement order. Other courts15 and writers10 have 
argued that relief should be based on the personal interests1 7 of member-
ship and the substantiality of damages due to expulsion. This court extends 
6 See, e.g., Levin v. Sinai Hospital, 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); see also Annot., 
24 A.L.R.2d 850, 852 (1952), for a discussion of exclusion of physicians and surgeons by 
hospital authorities. 
7 See Comment, 9 Cr.Ev.-MAR. L. R.Ev. 137 (1960). 
s The courts cannot compel the admission into such an association and if his applica-
tion is refused, he is entirely without legal remedy, no matter how arbitrary or unjust may 
be his exclusion. Medical Soc. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 138, 16 So. 2d 321, 324 (1944). 
9 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1951), for a discussion of suspension or expulsion from 
professional organizations and the remedies therefor; see also Chafee, supra note 4. 
10 See Ewald v. Medical Soc'y, 144 App. Div. 82, 128 'N.Y. Supp. 886 (1911); People 
ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. 187 (1865). 
11 "Recognizing that the real interests in an exclusion or an expulsion are personal 
••• the distinction which has arisen between expulsions and exclusions from voluntary 
organizations appears to be one of fiction, rather than of substance." Principal case at 196, 
162 A.2d at 330. Since plaintiff was an associate member at the time he was denied 
permanent membership, there may be a question whether this is not actually an expulsion 
situation. The Court, however, treats the case as one involving exclusion. 
12 "[The medical society] ••• may not escape these responsibilities by designating 
itself as a private, voluntary association. The court finds that the defendant society is an 
involuntary organization, clothed with such public responsibilities that its actions are 
subject to judicial scrutiny." Principal case at 199-200, 162 A.2d at 332. 
13 Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Medical Soc'y, 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (1938); 
State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Medical Sorfy, 295 Mo. 144, 243 S."W. 341 (1922) 
(severable interest required). 
14Smith v. Kem County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942). 
15 See Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 
P.2d 862 (1956); Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1917) 
16 See Chafee, supra note 4; see also Notes, 41 MINN. L. R.Ev. 212 (1957) and 5 UTAH 
L. R.Ev. 270 (1956). 
17 See Chafee, supra note 4, at 998. 
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the expulsion theory to cover e..xclusion cases by reasoning that since the 
damage is the same-the loss of privileges incident to membership-
whether one is expelled or excluded from an organization, relief should be 
given in exclusion cases just as in expulsion cases. It would seem, however, 
that the personal interests considered necessary for judicial relief are not 
based entirely upon the substantiality of the damage as this court suggests, 
but are at least partially related to an interest the person has as a result of 
having been a part of the organization.is Damage alone does not give rise 
to a cause of action.19 
The second departure from existing legal doctrine was the use of pre-
cedents20 from e..xclusion cases, involving medical societies which con-
trolled the right to practice medicine in the state. The court concluded that 
the nature of the organization was determinative;21 if an organization con-
trolled professional practice, then relief was given.22 In each of the cases 
cited by the court to support this conclusion, however, the medical associa-
tion concerned was incorporated23 by the state legislature and empowered 
to determine qualifications for the practice of medicine within the state.24 
There is no apparent authority for the proposition that private unin-
corporated organizations, such as the Medical Society in this case, are 
under any obligation to admit persons to membership on a non-arbitrary 
or non-discriminatory basis. Despite this distinction, the court found that 
the Medical Society in fact controlled the practice of medicine in the county 
and was thus an "involuntary organization."25 Upon closer examination, it 
appears that the "involuntary" designation was merely a reiteration of the 
court's substantial damage concept. I£ an organization controls the prac-
tice of medicine, deprivation of membership obviously results in substantial 
18 Chafee, supra note 4, at 1007. 
19 See Bondies v. Glenn, 119 S.W.2d 1095, 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 
20 Hillery v. Fedie Soc'y, 189 App. Div. 766, 179 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1919); People ex rel. 
Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, supra note 10; Rex v. Askew, 4 Burr. 2186, 98 Eng. Rep. 139 
(1768); cf. Gregg v. Mass. Medical Soc'y, 111 Mass. 185, 15 Am. Rep. 24 (1872). 
21 "Contrary to their theoretical discussions, the courts have, in fact, looked to the 
nature of the particular organization involved and to the degree of harm arising out of 
the particular act of the organization." Principal case at 196, 162 A.2d at 330. 
22 Cf. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Wilson v. News-
paper Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938) (common-law labor decisions 
which hold that a labor union with a monopoly on labor in the locality cannot take 
advantage of both a closed-shop agreement and discriminatory or arbitrary admission 
practices), 
23 See cases cited in note 20 supra. The court in the principal case states that 
previous decisions take into account the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
organizations in deciding whether to give relief. Apparently an organization is termed 
"involuntary" if it controls the practice of the profession. 
24 The medical associations in cases cited in note 20 supra were given powers equal 
to those of the Board of Medical Examiners in the principal case. They had the power 
to determine who could practice medicine within the state. 
25 "Although the A.M:.A. and its constituent and component parts have been desig-
nated by many courts as voluntary organizations, other courts and legal writers have 
recognized the involuntary nature of these associations." Principal case at 198, 162 A.2d 
at 331. 
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damage. If the organization does not control the practice of medicine, ex-
clusion from its membership could hardly be deemed to result in substantial 
damage. As a practical matter, therefore, an involuntary organization, as 
recognized by this court, could be defined as an organization whose e..xist-
ence causes those excluded to suffer substantial damage. The "involuntary 
organization" is thus a fictional concept. 
The real problem remains whether legal relief can be given to one in 
plaintiff's position in order to allow him to be considered for hospital staff 
membership without reference to Medical Society membership. This court 
held that the coercive practices by the Medical Society gave plaintiff a right 
to membership in the society; and consequently, he may regain his hospital 
privileges. The more direct solution would be to prohibit the hospitals' 
rejection of otherwise qualified physicians solely because of lack of mem-
bership in a private organization.26 Such a rule would impose no great 
restriction upon the hospital's discretion, and would still leave the hospital 
free to impose standards of high quality. Moreover, it would avoid estab-
lishing a precedent of compelling membership in private unincorporated 
organizations. 
David K. Kroll 
26 See Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews, supra note 5 (public hospital cannot be 
arbitrary or discriminatory in selecting its staff). 
